path: root/security
diff options
authorStephen Smalley <>2005-05-16 21:53:52 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <>2005-05-17 07:59:20 -0700
commit4c443d1b558b21520bd8fd6140b85cee0756becd (patch)
treee6d4fea8329bb709efd825ec14c9598a0c08e562 /security
parentb81074800b98ac50b64d4c8d34e8abf0fda5e3d1 (diff)
[PATCH] selinux: fix avc_alloc_node() oom with no policy loaded
This patch should fix the avc_alloc_node() oom condition that Andrew reported when no policy is loaded in SELinux. Prior to this patch, when no policy was loaded, the SELinux "security server" (policy engine) was only returning allowed decisions for the requested permissions for each access check. This caused the cache to thrash when trying to use SELinux for real work with no policy loaded (typically, the no policy loaded state is only for bootstrapping to the point where we can load an initial policy). This patch changes the SELinux security server to return the complete allowed access vector at once, and then to reset the cache after the initial policy load to flush the initial cache state created during bootstrapping. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <> Signed-off-by: James Morris <> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 5a820cf88c9c..8449d667b062 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -476,8 +476,8 @@ int security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
int rc = 0;
if (!ss_initialized) {
- avd->allowed = requested;
- avd->decided = requested;
+ avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
+ avd->decided = 0xffffffff;
avd->auditallow = 0;
avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
avd->seqno = latest_granting;
@@ -1196,9 +1196,11 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
policydb_loaded_version = policydb.policyvers;
ss_initialized = 1;
+ seqno = ++latest_granting;
+ avc_ss_reset(seqno);
+ selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
return 0;